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The main motivation of the present study stems from theencouragement we received from some government offi-
cials in Canada, to extend the earlier work on the analysis of
the pandemic influenza preparedness plans to the United
Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and the Netherlands
(1), and to assess the Canadian pandemic influenza prepared-
ness plan. Canada, like many other nations (2,3), has formulated
its pandemic preparedness plan in anticipation of a potential
pandemic. The current version of the 609-page plan (published
in 2006) entails the use of nonpharmaceutical interventions
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Mathematical assessment of Canada’s pandemic
influenza preparedness plan
Abba B Gumel PhD1, Miriam Nuño PhD2, Gerardo Chowell PhD3,4
AB Gumel, M Nuño, G Chowell. Mathematical assessment of
Canada’s pandemic influenza preparedness plan. Can J Infect Dis
Med Microbiol 2008;19(2):185-192.
OBJECTIVE: The presence of the highly pathogenic avian H5N1
virus in wild bird populations in several regions of the world, together
with recurrent cases of H5N1 influenza arising primarily from direct
contact with poultry, have highlighted the urgent need for prepared-
ness and coordinated global strategies to effectively combat a poten-
tial influenza pandemic. The purpose of the present study was to
evaluate the Canadian pandemic influenza preparedness plan.
PATIENTS AND METHODS: A mathematical model of the trans-
mission dynamics of influenza was used to keep track of the population
according to risk of infection (low or high) and infection status
(susceptible, exposed or infectious). The model was parametrized
using available Canadian demographic data. The model was then used
to evaluate the key components outlined in the Canadian plan.
RESULTS: The results indicated that the number of cases, mortalities
and hospitalizations estimated in the Canadian plan may have been
underestimated; the use of antivirals, administered therapeutically,
prophylactically or both, is the most effective single intervention
followed by the use of a vaccine and basic public health measures; and
the combined use of pharmaceutical interventions (antivirals and
vaccine) can dramatically minimize the burden of the pending
influenza pandemic in Canada. Based on increasing concerns of
Oseltamivir resistance (wide-scale implementation), coupled with the
expected unavailability of a suitable vaccine during the early stages of
a pandemic, the present study evaluated the potential impact of non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) which were not emphasized in
the current Canadian plan. To this end, the findings suggest that the
use of NPIs can drastically reduce the burden of a pandemic in
Canada.
CONCLUSIONS: A deterministic model was designed and used to
assess Canada’s pandemic preparedness plan. The study showed that
the estimates of pandemic influenza burden given in the Canada pan-
demic preparedness plan may be an underestimate, and that Canada
needs to adopt NPIs to complement its preparedness plan.
Key Words: Antivirals; Control measures; Influenza; Pandemic;
Preparedness plan; Vaccination
Une évaluation mathématique du plan 
canadien de préparation à la pandémie 
d’influenza 
OBJECTIF : La présence du virus aviaire H5N1 hautement pathogène au
sein de populations d’oiseaux sauvages de plusieurs régions du monde,
combinée aux cas récurrents d’influenza H5N1 surtout causés par un
contact direct avec de la volaille, soulignent l’urgence d’élaborer des
stratégies de préparation mondiales et coordonnées pour lutter avec
efficacité contre une pandémie d’influenza potentielle. La présente étude
visait à évaluer le plan canadien de préparation à la pandémie d’influenza.
PATIENTS ET MÉTHODOLOGIE : Les auteurs ont utilisé un modèle
mathématique de la dynamique de transmission de l’influenza pour suivre
la population d’après le risque d’infection (faible ou élevé) et le statut
d’infection (susceptible, exposé ou infectieux). Ils ont établi les paramètres
du modèle au moyen des données démographiques disponibles au Canada.
Ils ont ensuite utilisé le modèle pour évaluer les principaux éléments
exposés dans le plan canadien.
RÉSULTATS : D’après les résultats, le nombre de cas, de décès et
d’hospitalisations évalué dans le plan canadien pourrait être sous-estimé.
Le recours aux antiviraux, administrés pour des raisons thérapeutiques,
prophylactiques ou les deux, est l’intervention unique la plus efficace,
suivie par la vaccination et des mesures de santé publique de base.
L’association d’interventions pharmaceutiques (antiviraux et vaccin) peut
réduire considérablement le fardeau de la pandémie d’influenza escomptée
au Canada. Étant donné l’inquiétude croissante quant à la résistance à
l’oseltamivir (implantation généralisée) couplée à la non-disponibilité
prévue d’un vaccin convenable pendant les premières phases d’une
pandémie, la présente étude comprend une évaluation des répercussions
potentielles d’interventions non thérapeutiques (INT) qui n’ont pas été
mises de l’avant dans le plan canadien actuel. Ainsi, les observations
laissent supposer que les INT pourraient aussi réduire considérablement le
fardeau d’une pandémie au Canada.
CONCLUSION : Un modèle déterministe a été conçu et utilisé pour
évaluer le plan canadien de préparation à la pandémie. L’étude a révélé que
les évaluations du fardeau d’une pandémie d’influenza indiquées dans le
plan de préparation à une pandémie d’influenza pourraient être sous-
estimées et que le Canada doit adopter des INT pour compléter ce plan de
préparation.
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(NPIs) and pharmaceutical interventions (PIs) aimed at “cur-
tailing serious illness and overall deaths, and minimizing soci-
etal disruption among Canadians as a result of an influenza
pandemic” (4). Furthermore, the plan includes the use of effec-
tive surveillance systems, vaccination programs, antivirals and
basic public health control measures aimed at reducing the risk
of infection by discouraging public gatherings and school ses-
sions. Similar to the plans proposed by the UK, the US and the
Netherlands (5-7), Canada acknowledges the benefits of
antivirals (both therapeutically and prophylactically) in reduc-
ing and slowing down the impact of a pandemic (particularly
during the early stage of the pandemic, before a vaccine
becomes available). Although Canadian public health officials
recognize the importance of minimizing the impact of a poten-
tial pandemic via the use of the aforementioned interventions,
a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the potential ben-
efits of these interventions has not been carried out.
A number of mathematical modelling studies (1,7-15),
using stochastic as well as deterministic formulations, have
been carried out to quantify the burden of a potential influenza
pandemic and to assess various interventions. Most of these
studies (9,10,12-15) adopt large-scale stochastic simulation
models to study nationwide spread of influenza. No doubt that
these detailed modelling and simulation frameworks provide
reasonable estimates and assessments of the potential impact of
an influenza pandemic; however, the actual implementation of
these models seem to rely on state-of-the-art computing
resources and highly specific data, which are unlikely to be
available in most countries (especially at the onset of a
pandemic) (12).
In the present study, a deterministic compartmental model
of the transmission dynamics of influenza was used to evaluate
the potential impact of a pandemic in Canada under various
control strategies. The model, which was used by the authors
to evaluate the pandemic influenza preparedness plans for the
Netherlands, the UK and the US (1), is simulated using demo-
graphic data from Canada. A schematic description of the
model is depicted in Figure 1; and the associated parameters
are defined in Table 1. The present study provides a thorough
assessment of the potential role of transmission control
measures, antivirals and a vaccine to combat an influenza pan-
demic in Canada.
PATIENTS AND METHODS
The model (1) (Appendix, Figure 1) was used to evaluate var-
ious pandemic scenarios outlined in Canada’s influenza pre-
paredness plan (4). The model, which is deterministic in
nature, subdivides the total Canadian population according to
risk of infection (based on two main groupings, namely low risk
or high risk) and current epidemiological states (eg, suscepti-
ble, exposed and infectious). For instance, the class of high-
risk susceptible individuals is denoted by Sh, while that of
low-risk susceptible individuals is represented by Sl. Although
the epidemiological classes of the model are categorized
according to a host’s risk of infection, the model does not
stratify the population according to ages (hence, it assumes
that influenza spreads equally among age groups). The model is
parametrized using Canadian-specific demographic data
(Table 2), and is simulated under various scenarios to evaluate
the Canadian plan. The first set of simulations carried out are
associated with the baseline scenario (worst-case scenario),
which represents the case in which no interventions have been
Gumel et al
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TABLE 1
Parameter and corresponding definitions used in the
proposed model
Parameter Definition
R
i
0
Basic reproduction number 
ηi Relative infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals 
p Fraction of nontreated latent individuals who progress to
symptomatic class 
1/φi Latent period (days) 
ψi Disease progression rate to late infectious class (days–1) 
αi Hospitalization rate (days
–1)
γIi Recovery rate for infectious individuals (days
–1)
γAi Recovery rate for asymptomatic individuals (days
–1) 
γHi Recovery rate for hospitalized individuals (days
–1) 
CFPi Case fatality proportion for i-risk individuals 
δi Mortality rate (days
–1), δi = (CFPi /1–CFPi) × γHi
πi Community transmission reduction parameter 
ζi Relative infectiousness of hospitalized individuals 
qi Fraction of therapeutic antiviral recipients 
ai Fraction of latent individuals who are treated with antiviral 
medication 
∈Ai Antiviral efficacy 
σi Average protection rate via prophylaxis (days
–1)
ρi Prophylactic antiviral rate (days
–1)
φi Therapeutic antiviral rate for latent and asymptomatic
individuals (days–1)
ξi Therapeutic antiviral rate (days
–1) 
γT Recovery rate of treated individuals (days
–1)
∈Vi Vaccine efficacy 
Vi Vaccination rate (days
–1)
Ki Vaccine-induced protection rate (days
–1)
The index i is used to denote the high-risk and low-risk classes. Particular val-
ues assumed are provided in reference 1
Figure 1) Flowchart diagram describing high- and low-risk populations
considered in the proposed model (1), in which index i denotes high-risk
and low-risk classes. Antiviral prophylaxis is only available to suscepti-
bles while treatment may be given to latent, early-stage infectious and
asymptomatic individuals. C and D classes account for the number of
protected (via vaccination) and deceased cases, respectively
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implemented. Further details about the formulation, analysis
and simulations of the model can be obtained from Nuño et al
(1).
The severity of an influenza pandemic can be quantified by
its transmissibility as measured by the basic reproduction num-
ber. This quantity, denoted by R0, represents the average num-
ber of secondary cases generated by an infectious individual
during his or her infectious period, in a completely susceptible
population. Severe outbreaks are associated with higher R0 val-
ues, while mild outbreaks correspond to lower R0 values. For
instance, estimates for the basic reproduction number of the
1918/1919 influenza pandemic for several regions of the world
ranged between 1.5 and 5.4 (16-21). This variability in esti-
mates of R0 can be attributed to the specific location and pan-
demic wave considered, as well as the spatial aggregation of the
data and estimation method. As a comparison, the transmissi-
bility of seasonal influenza epidemics (in which a fraction of
the population is effectively protected from infection due to
vaccination campaigns or cross-immunity) has been estimated
to be approximately 1.3 with important year-to-year variability
(22).
To compare the results of the present study with those pro-
jected in the Canadian plan (4), scenarios corresponding to
mild, moderate and severe outbreaks were evaluated by consid-
ering a range of R0 between 1.6 and 2.4. Table 3 provides the
number of infections, hospitalizations and deaths that may be
expected for the various ranges of R0 simulated. The estimates
indicate that incrementing R0 from 1.6 to 2.4 increases the
clinical attack rate from 30% to 51%, while yielding a case
fatality rate of 4% (1). It should be emphasized that the afore-
mentioned ranges for R0 are within the estimates discussed in
the Canadian plan, and the clinical attack rates are compara-
ble with those of other developed countries.
RESULTS
Several intervention scenarios were evaluated to study the
impact of a potential influenza pandemic in Canada. NPIs
were assessed in hospital settings and the general community
based on transmission control measures that rely on the indi-
vidual effort to increase hygiene, wear face masks and avoid
social gatherings. PI strategies assume the implementation of
antivirals and a prepandemic vaccine. Although it is not clear
what the effectiveness (if any) of a nonpandemic strain vac-
cine would be, it is assumed that readily available vaccine
resources may be used to alleviate symptoms and combat infec-
tion. The combination of these interventions (NPIs and PIs)
will also be assessed.
NPIs: Basic control measures
The impact of basic transmission control measures only in the
community or hospitals alone were studied, and these inter-
ventions were evaluated in both settings. As stated in the
Canadian influenza pandemic preparedness plan, community-
based interventions may include reduction in the transmission
rate of disease through increased hygiene, face masks and
closing places of public gatherings and schools. First, it is
assumed that these basic transmission control measures are
implemented partially and, thus, vary reduction levels in the
transmission rate (risk of infection). In particular, if these basic
control measures are only implemented in hospitals, and not in
communities (ie, πi=1 and ζi≠1) and the efficacy of the hospi-
tal intervention is assumed to vary between 10% (ζi=0.9) and
90% (ζi=0.1), the number of deaths, hospitalizations and
infections can be reduced (from the baseline) significantly by
73% (from 559,612 to 120,992), 79% (from seven million to
1.5 million) and 77% (from 14 million to 3.2 million), respec-
tively (Table 4, top panel). Similarly, the potential impact of
reducing control measures in the community setting alone can
be assessed (πi ∈ [0.1, 1] and ζi=1). This scenario gives even
better outcome than the previous one (Table 4, panel 2). The
results of an outbreak assuming a baseline were compared with
a strategy that implemented 20% control measures in the com-
munity for various ranges of R0 (Figure 2). It can be observed
that for mild influenza pandemics (R0=1.6), 20% community-
based transmission reduction control measures suffice to con-
tain the rate of infection below what is typically observed
during seasonal influenza outbreaks. However, as R0 exceeds
1.9, these level of interventions are no longer sufficient to
maintain disease at low levels.
The combined use of the two basic control measures is also
explored. For instance, assuming the implementation of a 20%
effective basic control measure in the community, while allow-
ing hospital control measures to vary between 0% and 90% (or
assuming 20% control measures in the hospital while varying
community measures between 0% and 90%) reduces deaths,
hospitalizations and infections dramatically (Table 4, third and
fourth panels). Furthermore, to assess some of the expected
Assessment of Canada’s pandemic influenza preparedness plan
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TABLE 2
Initial conditions used for Canada and baseline estimates
used in previous studies
Population size, n 33,098,932*
High risk, % 20
Low risk, % 80
Initial conditions 
Sh; Sl 6,619,786; 26,479,146
Ei1; Ei2 50;50
Ii1; Ii2 1;1
Baseline predicted in the literature†
R0, range 1.4–1.8 
Case fatality, % 4 
Clinical attack rate, % (range) 15–35 
Hospitalization rate, % 1 
*Statistics accessed at July 2006 from reference 26; †Data from reference 4
TABLE 3
Baseline estimates (no intervention) for the cumulative
number of infections, hospitalizations (HZ) and deaths for
several basic reproduction numbers (R
0
) for Canada*
Clinical Case
Infections HZ Deaths attack rate fatality rate
R
0
(million) (million) (n) (%) (%)
1.6 10 5.2 417,822 30 4 
1.9 14 7.0 559,612 42 4 
2.1 15 7.7 609,285 45 4 
2.4 17 8.5 670,276 51 4 
Clinical attack rate denotes the ratio of total infections and total population
size, case fatality percentage denotes the ratio of deceased individuals and
total infections. Baseline estimates provided by model in Section 2.1 in which
R0=max{R
h
0 , R
l
0 } . *Proposed model used from reference 1
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uncertainties associated with the use of basic control measures
(it is prudent to expect that any estimates for efficacy of these
measures, for instance, may involve a certain degree of uncer-
tainty), the impact of these measures is also studied by assum-
ing a fixed reduction factor for either community or hospital
settings while sampling 100 simulation values of the other
(nonfixed) control measure. The mean number of deaths, hos-
pitalizations and infections are then calculated under this sce-
nario. The results, tabulated in Table 5, illustrate that basic
control measures are more effective when introduced in the
general community rather than in hospitals.
The impact of these measures is illustrated graphically in
Figure 3, in which it is shown that a program based on the use
of hospital control measures alone (and no reduction in
community transmission, πi=1), requires a 100% reduction in
hospital transmission to significantly reduce morbidity and
mortality (left upper panel). Furthermore, a 70% (1–πi≈0.3)
reduction in community control measures reduces morbidity
and mortality significantly (right upper panel). However,
using a fixed 20% reduction in community transmission
(πi=0.8) or hospital transmission (ζi=0.8) reduces the
required threshold of hospital and community control meas-
ures from 100% to 75% and from 70% to 50%, respectively
(bottom panel).
Because the impact of basic control measures (4) was fully
modelled, the role of these interventions was studied for
several pandemic scenarios (corresponding to R0=1.6, 1.9, 2.1
and 2.4). Figure 4 shows that reductions in hospital control
measures necessary to significantly reduce morbidity and
mortality depends strongly on R0. For instance, as R0 increases
from 1.6 to 1.9, hospital control measures necessary to effec-
tively curtail the pandemic-related morbidity and mortality
increases from 30% to 75%. However, if R0 increases to 2.4,
hospital control measures alone are shown to ineffectively
combat an influenza pandemic in Canada (Figure 4, right-
bottom panel). A detailed summary of the impact of control
measures for an R0 baseline of 1.9 is depicted in Table 4.
PIs
In this section, it is assumed that two main PIs, namely antivi-
rals and a vaccine, are used. Antivirals may be implemented
therapeutically, prophylactically or in combination; and a vac-
cination program is implemented either alone or in combina-
tion with antivirals. While considering the impact of single
PIs, it is assumed that antivirals may be administered thera-
peutically and prophylactically. The impact of the uncertainty
Gumel et al
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Figure 2) Baseline scenarios illustrating the final number of infections,
hospitalizations and deaths for various basic reproduction numbers
assuming (A) no basic control measures and (B) 20% basic control
measures in the community. The dashed line emphasizes the clinical
attack rate for a typical (seasonal) influenza outbreak (10% clinical
attack rate)
TABLE 4
Baseline estimates (R
0
=1.9) for the final cumulative
deaths, hospitalizations and total cases for various
scenarios of control measures in hospital and community
settings
Reduction 
factors (%) Deaths Hospitalizations Infections
π
i
ζ
i
1-π
i
, 1-ζ
i
(n) (n) (n)
1.0 0.1 0, 90 120,992 1.5 M 3.2 M
1.0 0.4 0, 60 359,821 4.5 M 9 M
1.0 0.7 0, 30 482,754 6.1 M 12.2 M
1.0 0.9 0, 10 540,429 6.8 M 13.6 M
1.0 1.0 0, 0 559,612 7 M 14 M
0.1 1.0 90, 0 12 149 295
0.4 1.0 60, 0 7,710 103,515 216,916
0.7 1.0 30, 0 430,123 5.4 M 11 M
0.9 1.0 10, 0 529,758 6.7 M 13.4 M
1.0 1.0 0, 0 559,612 M 7 M 14 M
0.8 0.1 20, 90 29 353 701
0.8 0.4 20, 60 52,896 700,759 1.5 M
0.8 0.7 20, 30 360,857 4.5 M 9.1 M
0.8 0.9 20, 10 448,548 5.7 M 11.3 M
0.8 1.0 20, 0 477,073 6 M 12 M
0.1 0.8 90, 20 8 89 175
0.4 0.8 60, 20 81 1012 2029
0.7 0.8 30, 20 337,388 4.2 M 8.5 M
0.9 0.8 10, 20 460,164 6 M 12 M
1.0 0.8 0, 20 508,852 6.4 M 13 M
Parameters 1-πi and 1-ζi denote efficacy of transmission control measures in
communities and hospitals, respectively. M Million
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TABLE 5
Mean results of 100 simulations generated by uniformly sampling the antiviral and vaccine efficacy from appropriate
ranges as assumed in each scenario. Baseline scenario assumes R
0
=1.9
Dmean Hmean Imean Tmean Pmean Cmean
Single interventions (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n)
Control measures only*
Hospital measures only 290,773 3.6 M 7.3 M NA NA NA
Community measures only 17,304 230,029 477,670 NA NA NA
Combined measures (20% hospital reduction fixed) 146 1889 3863 NA NA NA
Combined measures (20% community reduction fixed) 35,497 458,885 940,200 NA NA NA
Antiviral only†
lb
Treatment and prophylaxis: sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 15 196 430 141 9.4×10
8 NA
Treatment and prophylaxis: sampled ∈Al ∈ (0.5; 0.7) 14 169 371 126 10×10
8 NA
Treatment only: sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 405,598 5.3 M 12 M 3.8 M NA NA
Treatment only: sampled ∈Al ∈ (0.5; 0.7) 408,765 5.2 M 12 M 4 M NA NA
Prophylaxis only: sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 74 954 1907 NA 9.2×10
8 NA
Prophylaxis only: sampled ∈Al ∈ (0.5; 0.7) 37 475 946 NA 10×10
8 NA
ub
Treatment and prophylaxis: sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 3 29 115 109 11×10
8 NA
Treatment and prophylaxis: sampled ∈Al ∈ (0.5; 0.7) 3 32 122 112 10×10
8 NA
Treatment only: sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 12 147 617 580 NA NA
Treatment only: sampled ∈Al ∈ (0.5; 0.7) 46 600 2266 1902 NA NA
Prophylaxis only: sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 19 236 468 NA 11×10
8 NA
Prophylaxis only: sampled ∈Al ∈ (0.5; 0.7) 24 305 606 NA 11×10
8 NA
Vaccine only‡
lb
Sampled ∈Vl ∈ (0.5; 0.7) 9 90 177 NA NA 33 M
Sampled ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 10 105 206 NA NA 33 M
ub
Sampled ∈Vl ∈ (0.7; 0.9) 7 79 154 NA NA 33 M
Sampled ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 7 69 133 NA NA 33 M
The mean number of deceased (Dmean), hospitalized (Hmean), infections (Imean), antiviral treatment (Tmean), antiviral prophylaxis (Pmean) and vaccinated (Cmean) indi-
viduals. The antiviral-only scenario considers lower-bound (lb) and upper-bound (ub) parameters (presented in reference 2) for treatment and prophylaxis, treat-
ment-only and prophylaxis antivirals-only, respectively. *Mean of 100 simulations sampled from (ζiπi) ∈ (0.1, 0.5); 
†Mean of 100 simulations sampled from ∈Ah ∈
(0.3; 0.5) and ∈Al ∈ (0.5; 0.7); 
‡Mean of 100 simulations sampled from ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5) and/or ∈Vl ∈ (0.7; 0.9). M Million, NA Not applicable
Figure 3) The final number of deaths, hospitalizations and infections
for varying reduction factors in hospital (1–ζi) and community settings
(1–πi). Top panels assume single control measures in either hospitals
(πi=1: left upper panel) or in community (ζi=1: right upper panel)
while bottom panels assume control measures in both of these settings.
R0=1.9 is assumed
Figure 4) Baseline scenarios illustrating the final number of deaths,
hospitalizations and infections for varying levels of hospital control
measures. A fixed 20% (πi=0.9) reduction in community control
measures was assumed and hospital control measures were varied from
0% to 100% (ζi) for R0=1.6, 1.9, 2.1, 2.4
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involved in the use of PIs (measured primarily in terms of the
uncertainty in antiviral efficacy and coverage rates) is investi-
gated. Simulations assume several scenarios that can be
considered as ‘optimistic’ and ‘less optimistic’. In the former
scenario, high-coverage and efficacy levels are assumed while
in the latter, these levels are low. First, the scenario in which
antivirals are implemented both therapeutically and/or pro-
phylactically for the lower-bound (lb) and the upper-bound
(ub) parameters for various ranges of antiviral efficacy (∈Ah,
∈Al) is considered. Assuming antiviral efficacy variability
between 30% and 50% (∈A ∈ [0.3, 0.5]) for high-risk individ-
uals results in 15 deaths, 196 hospitalizations and 430 infec-
tions (average values shown in Table 5). However, using the
optimistic parameter values (ub), these estimates reduce to
three deaths, 29 hospitalizations and 115 infections. Then the
scenario in which antivirals are implemented therapeutically
only (ρi=σi=0) for both the lb and ub parameters is
considered. Here, the optimistic scenario gives an estimate of
12 deaths, 147 hospitalizations and 617 infections. It is worth
noting that in the less optimistic scenario, these estimates are
significantly higher. Considering the scenario in which
antivirals are implemented prophylactically only (qi=ai=θi=0),
it is shown that high coverage rates and antiviral efficacy
estimates the average number of deaths to 19, hospitalizations
236 and 468 infections, compared with the less optimistic
estimates (74 deaths, 954 hospitalizations and 1907 infec-
tions) (Table 5).
Although Canada anticipates that a pandemic-specific
influenza vaccine will not be available during the first wave of
the pandemic, the potential role of an antipandemic vaccine is
explored by assuming that a ‘partially suitable’ vaccine is avail-
able at the onset of the pandemic. Our results for the four sce-
narios that allow for variability in vaccine efficacy for both
high- (∈Vh ∈ [0.3, 0.5]) and low-risk (∈Vl ∈ [0.7, 0.9])
individuals show seven to nine deaths, 69 to 105 hospitaliza-
tions, and 133 to 206 infections. Last, several scenarios are
explored that involve combined interventions (Table 6).
Because the current preparedness plan for Canada involves the
combined use of the aforementioned PIs, the impact of the
combined use of antivirals and a vaccine is also assessed.
Several scenarios were also evaluated allowing for variability in
vaccine (∈Vi) and antivirals (∈Ai) efficacy for both high- and
low-risk individuals. The results show a mean of two to
six deaths, 22 to 67 hospitalizations, and 76 to 146 infections
(Table 6).
In summary, the present study results for single interven-
tions suggest that the use of antivirals, both therapeutically
and prophylactically, is the most effective single strategy for
combating an influenza pandemic in Canada (this is in con-
formity to the results by Nuño et al [1] and Ferguson et al [10]).
This is followed by the use of a vaccine. Although our results
for the singular use of basic control measures (in hospitals and
communities) are not as effective as the use of antivirals or a
vaccine, the reduction in morbidity and mortality provided by
the former is notably significant. Thus, it is prudent to also
consider intervention plans that incorporate basic control
measures in Canada’s plan (especially in light of the expected
delay in vaccine availability during the early stages of the pan-
demic and the potential risk of resistance development in per-
sons taking antivirals).
DISCUSSION
Canada’s pandemic influenza preparedness plan includes an
assessment of health and economic impact of a prospective pan-
demic (23). The Canadian plan reports estimates of clinical
attack rates that range from 15% to 35%. For these rates, the
average number of influenza cases obtained were 4,545,177 and
10,605,415, respectively. These estimates included the average
number of deaths, hospitalizations and infections for the corre-
sponding clinical attack rate. Compared with our model, the
Canadian plan estimates did not account for the basic trans-
mission control measures, antivirals and the vaccine.
We carried out both baseline scenarios, and scenarios that
involved the evaluation of the potential impact of PIs and
NPIs. Furthermore, our study stratified the Canadian popula-
tion according to epidemiological states and specified risk-
specific subpopulations. The results obtained from our study
suggest that the burden of an influenza pandemic in Canada
may be larger than the 10,284,2265 cases of morbidity and
mortality (assuming a 35% attack rate and a demographic data
of 1999) discussed in the Canada preparedness plan (4).
Although it is not clear what is the estimate of R0 that is
associated to the above estimate of the final epidemic size (as
reported in the Canadian plan), our simulations yield an
estimate of 15,617,822 (Table 2), assuming an R0 value of 1.6
(the smallest in the range of simulations). Our findings sug-
gest that the Canadian plan may be underestimating the
potential burden of an influenza pandemic. However, if
control measures are incorporated in our model, the estimate
obtained (11,190,773, Table 5 for πi=1 and ζi ∈ [0.1, 0.5])
compares reasonably well with that reported in the Canadian
plan.
Although the assumption of the availability of a partially-
suitable vaccine at the onset of a pandemic is clearly not a
realistic one, our study assumes that a nonpandemic-specific
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TABLE 6
Mean results of 100 simulations generated by uniformly
sampling the antiviral and vaccine efficacy from
appropriate ranges as assumed in each scenario. Baseline
scenario assumes R
0
=1.9
Combined Interventions Dmean Hmean Imean Tmean Pmean Cmean
Antiviral vaccine*
lb: Antivirals and vaccine: 6 60 130 46 7.6 M 33 M
sampled ∈Vl ∈ (0.7; 0.9)
lb: Antivirals and vaccine: 6 67 146 50 7.6 M 33 M
sampled ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5)
ub: Antivirals and vaccine: 2 22 80 76 10 M 33 M
sampled ∈Vl ∈ (0.7; 0.9)
ub: Antivirals and vaccine: 2 22 76 74 10 M 33 M
sampled ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5)
Control measures and antivirals†
lb: Sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 7 87 188 78 9×10
8 NA
ub: Sampled ∈Ah ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 3 31 102 88 10×10
8 NA
Control measures, antivirals and vaccine‡
lb: Sampled ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 5 53 115 40 7.6 M 33 M
ub: Sampled ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5) 2 20 70 68 10 M 33 M
The mean number of deceased (Dmean), hospitalized (Hmean), infections
(Imean), antiviral treatment (Tmean), antiviral prophylaxis (Pmean) and vaccinat-
ed (Cmean) individuals. *Mean of 100 simulations sampled from ∈Vl ∈ (0.7;
0.9) and ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5); 
†Mean of 100 simulations sampled from ∈Ah ∈ (0.3;
0.5); ‡Mean of 100 simulations sampled from ∈Vh ∈ (0.3; 0.5). M million; NA
Not applicable; ub upper-bound; lb lower-bound parameters presented in ref-
erence 1
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vaccine may be available and could be used to provide partial
protection. Canada’s current plan of action involves mass
vaccination implemented on a continuous prioritized basis
(eg, health care workers and high-risk individuals) and soon
after the pandemic strain-specific vaccine becomes available.
However, the availability of a fully effective vaccine is likely
to be available long (approximately six to nine months) after
the onset of the first observed cases. The present study
suggests that the use of a partially effective vaccine, combined
with the potential benefits of a readily available pneumococ-
cal vaccine (which forms part of the preparedness plans of the
UK and the Netherlands) could prevent influenza-related
complications and help curtail the burden of an influenza
pandemic in Canada.
Finally, our study suggests that the use of antivirals is the
most effective means of reducing morbidity and mortality
associated with pandemic influenza in Canada. However, the
relatively recent mutations of the avian influenza virus in
humans in Egypt, to a form that might be resistant to the
antiviral medications (24), suggest some caution in the use of
this intervention (25). Considering this concern (danger of
antiviral resistance) and the expected shortage of a suitable
vaccine during the early stages of an influenza pandemic, it
seems prudent to emphasize and develop methods to further
evaluate NPIs in the Canadian plan.
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APPENDIX
Mathematical model
The total population is denoted by N (t) and consists of a
number of mutually exclusive subpopulations according to
their epidemiological state: susceptible (Si), latent (Li), early-
stage infectious Ii1, late-stage infectious Ii2 , asymptomatic and
partially infectious (Ai), hospitalized (Hi), therapeutic (T) and
prophylactic (Pi) antiviral recipients, successfully vaccinated
(but not yet protected) (Vi), protected via vaccination (C),
recovered (R) and disease-induced dead (D) individuals, in
which the index i is used to denote the high-risk (h) and low-
risk (l) individuals. The model consists of the following system
of differential equations (where a dot represents differentiation
with respect to time).
Si = σiPi – (∈Ai ρi + νi + λi)Si 
Li = λiSi + λVi Vi – (ai∈Ai θi + (1 – ai)φi)Li
Ai = (1 – ai)(1 – ρ)φiLi – (∈Ai φi + γAi)Ai
Ii1 = (1 – ai)ρφiLi – [∈Ai ξiqi + (1 – qi)Vi + (1 – ∈Ai)qiVi]Ii1
Ii2 = [(1 – ∈Ai)qiVi + (1 – qi)Vi]Ii1 – (γIi + αi)Ii2
Hi = αiIi2 – (γHi + δi)Hi
Pi = ∈Ai ρiSi – (σi + ∈Vi νi)Pi
T = ∈Ai ∑(aiφiLi + qiξiIi1 + θiAi) – γT T
Vi = ∈Vi ViPi + viSi – (λVi + Ki)Vi
R = ∑(γAi Ai + γIi Ii2 + γHi Hi) + γT T
C = ∑ KiVi
D = ∑ δiHi
Assessment of Canada’s pandemic influenza preparedness plan
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